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Abstract. - In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods
games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the
groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of assuming that the social network of
contacts self-defines a group structure with identical topological properties, we disentangle these
two interaction patterns so to deal with systems having groups of definite sizes embedded in social
networks with a tunable degree of heterogeneity. Surpisingly, this realistic framework, reveals that
social heterogeneity may not foster cooperation depending on the game setting and the updating
rule.
Introduction. – The last few years have witnessed
the success of the application of physical techniques and
concepts to social systems [1]. One topic that has at-
tracted a considerable amount of attention is the evolu-
tionary dynamics [2, 3] of social dilemmas [4]: Situations
in which an individually desirable outcome leads to an
undesirable one from a societal viewpoint. A particularly
important paradigm in this class is the tragedy of the com-
mons [5] or, as it is more generally known, the Public
Goods game [6, 7]. In a Public Goods game (PGG), al-
truist or cooperative individuals in a group of m people
contribute an amount c (cost) to the public good; selfish
people or defectors do not contribute. The total contri-
bution is multiplied by an enhancement factor r < m and
the result is equally distributed between all m members
of the group. Hence, defectors get the same benefit of
cooperators at no cost, i.e., they free-ride on the coop-
erators effort. The dilemma then arises as nobody has
any incentive to contribute to the public good, and there-
fore nobody receives any benefit. A number of hypotheses
have been put forward to explain why people might even-
tually contribute to a public good, including reputation,
punishment, beliefs and other factors [8, 9].
One of such hypotheses is of particular relevance for our
research, namely, that contributions to a public good are
enhanced by the assortment of individuals. This implies
that contributors interact mostly with other contributors
and therefore end up doing better than free-riders. There
are several roads to assortment but prominent among
them is the existence of a social network that dictates
who interact with whom. This proposal, originating [10]
on work on another paradigm, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
[11], has given rise to an explosion of research on evolu-
tionary game theory on graphs [12, 13]. For the specific
context of the PGG, the issue was considered by Brandt
et al. [14], whose numerical simulations indicated that lo-
cal interactions can foster contribution, even for values of
r well below the critical value r = m (above this threshold
contributing is obviously always the best option). While
this result was obtained on an hexagonal lattice, subse-
quent research [15, 16] generalized it to other lattices as
well as to heterogeneous scale-free (SF) [17] networks.
Within the above context, and following the seminal
work by Santos et al. [16] about the PGG on top of com-
plex networks, it is widely accepted that SF topologies
enhance considerably the emergence of cooperation as it
was previously observed for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
[18, 19]. In the case of the PGG [16] it is assumed that
each of the groups in which the game is played is auto-
matically defined by considering each player and all of
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Fig. 1: A model network composed of 11 nodes is shown. Each
node engages in different groups of sizem = 3. The correspond-
ing interaction backbone results appears projected below.
her neighbors in the network. Following this recipe, sev-
eral mechanisms aimed at further enhancing cooperation
on SF networks have been investigated [20–27]. However,
the structure of most real networks [28] reveals that the
above assumption about the structure of the interaction
groups does not hold. On the contrary, most real interac-
tion networks comprise many small modules of densely in-
terconnected nodes in which group interactions take place.
More importantly, these small modules tend to overlap
only slightly [29], so that a given node rarely involves all
its social acquaintances when collaborating in one groupal
task. Therefore, the existing works on the PGG on net-
works have neglected the role of the mesoscale patterns, i.
e., the groups in which the PGG is played.
The aim of this Letter is to use the PGG to gain knowl-
edge on the effects of social heterogeneity (that arising
when looking at the number of social contacts of nodes)
when the mesoscale structure of small interaction modules
is incorporated. Recent work by us [30] hints that the fos-
tering of cooperation observed on heterogeneous networks
may be different depending on whether the mesoscopic
structure of real collaboration networks is incorporated or
not. Thus, the question arises naturally as to what are
the effects of social heterogeneity when a mesoscale struc-
ture is incorporated in synthetic models of homogeneous
(Erdo¨s-Re´nyi [17]) and heterogeneous SF networks. Thus,
the answer to this question allows to disentangle the in-
fluence of social heterogeneity from that imposed to the
group structure in [16]. Surprisingly, our results show that
cooperation is not an increasing function of social hetero-
geneity. On the contrary, an homogeneous social struc-
ture may lead to larger levels of cooperation depending
on the game setting and the updating rule at work. We
believe that this is an important contribution to both evo-
lutionary games on graphs and dynamics involving group
interactions on networks, in so far as data on social col-
laborations very often reveals a rather homogenous group
structure embedded in heterogeneous social networks.
Interaction networks and group structure. – Let
us start by introducing the complex networks in which the
evolutionary dynamics of the PGG will be implemented.
In Fig. 1 we show a model network composed of 11 individ-
uals with a complex interaction backbone. The complex
interaction backbone described by the connections among
pairs of nodes appears as the projection of the seven inter-
action groups highlighted in Fig. 1. Each of these groups
comprises three individuals and represents the interaction
groups in which collaborative tasks take place. It is evi-
dent that the set of groups is enough to define univocally
the resulting complex backbone of interactions. However,
the information provided solely by the projected network
does not allow to recover the groups in which each indi-
vidual has been involved to produce the final topology.
The above example highlights that any dynamical pro-
cess involving group interactions, such as the PGG, cannot
be treated from the macroscopic interaction backbone but
it demands to incorporate the mesoscopic patterns aris-
ing from the integration of all the interaction groups. To
this aim, it is useful to represent the system as a bipartite
network [31] in which two types of nodes coexist: individ-
uals and groups. The bipartite nature of a system such as
the one shown in Fig. 1 is characterized by two distribu-
tions: (i) the probability that an individual participates
in q groups, P (q), and (ii) the probability that m individ-
uals take part of one group, P (m). In order to construct
such bipartite graphs we will consider a method of net-
work generation inspired in a model [32] aimed at mim-
icking the structure of scientific collaboration networks.
Inspired in this context, where the interaction groups rep-
resent co-authored articles, and also in real collaboration
data [33–35], we consider the size m of the groups to be
small and homogeneous (note that m = 3 in Fig. 1).
As in [32], the construction of our networks relies on an
iterative process in which interaction groups are created
sequentially starting from an initial core of m individuals
(that by itself constitutes the first group of the system)
and a set of (N − m) unconnected individuals. At each
step of the process, a new individual from the unconnected
set defines a new group of size m by choosing its (m− 1)
partners among the remaining (N − 1) individuals in the
system. In order to generate a family of networks interpo-
lating between homogeneous and heterogeneous topologies
we adopt a similar strategy to that of the model introduced
in [36]. For each of its (m− 1) choices, the newcomer as-
signs a probability Πi to the other (N − 1) nodes. With
probability α the newcomer makes the choice completely
random so that the probability Πi that a node i is selected
by the newcomer is Πi = 1/(N − 1). On the other hand,
with probability (1 − α), the newcomer selects a partner
i proportionally to the number of groups i belongs to, qi,
so that Πi = qi/
∑
j qj . When the newcomer has selected
(m− 1) partners, the new group is constituted. This pro-
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Fig. 2: Figures (A) and (B) show respectively the probability
distribution for the number of groups each individual belongs
to, P (q), and the probability that a group is composed of m
players, P (m), for those networks generated via random selec-
tion of group partners (α = 1). In (C) and (D) we show the
two latter distributions for networks generated with preferen-
tial selection of group partners (α = 0).
cess is iterated (N −m) times so that the final network is
composed of (N − m + 1) groups and N individuals. In
our case we will fix N = 5000.
Obviously, when α = 1 the network groups are always
formed following a random selection rule so that the final
probabilty that a node participates in q groups follows
a Poisson distribution centered around m (see Fig. 2.A
for which m = 3) similarly to Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) graphs.
Alternatively, when α = 0 the group structure is created
by means of a preferential choice so that the probability
P (q) follows a scale-free (SF) distribution, P (q) ∼ q−3
with mean 〈q〉 = m (see Fig. 2.C). Let us recall that these
two topologies are homogeneous (ER) and heterogeneous
(SF) only from the point of view of the number of groups
each individual participates in, i.e., regarding the social
structure. However in both topologies the group structure
is homogeneous, so that P (m) is a delta function centered
around m (see Fig. 2.B and 2.D). Let us note that the
projected versions of the bipartite networks constructed
with α = 0 and α = 1 correspond to SF and ER networks
respectively. In the remainder of the Letter we will focus
on these two limiting cases (ER and SF) in order to unveil
the effects that social heterogeneity [as described by P (q)]
has on the evolution of cooperation.
Having set the network structure we encode it by means
of a biadjacency matrix {Bji} [with j = 1, ..., (N −m+1)
and i = 1, ..., N ] so that Bji = 1 if agent i participates
in group j and Bji = 0 otherwise. With this topological
information one can define the dynamics of the PGG as
follows. At each time step t, each individual i plays a
round of the PGGwithin each of the qi groups it is engaged
to. Obviously, the benefit obtained in each of these games
depends on the strategies of the m agents participating
in each group. If we denote by xti the strategy of agent i
during round t of the PGG, so that xti = 1 when i plays as
cooperator and xti = 0 when i defects, the overall benefit
after playing round t of the PGG reads:
fi(t) =
N−m+1∑
j=1
rBji
m
[
N∑
l=1
Bjlx
t
lcl
]
− xticiqi , (1)
where qi is (as defined above) the number of groups in
which i is engaged and ci accounts for the cost payed by
agent i in each of her qi groups when playing as cooperator.
We will study two formulations of the PGG (as defined in
[16]). First, we consider a fixed cost per game (FCG)
formulation so that each cooperator i invests a fixed cost
ci = z in each of the qi groups she participates in. Al-
ternatively, we will also study the situation of fixed cost
per individual (FCI). In this latter scenario, a cooperator
invests a total amount z that is equally distributed among
all her qi groups so that ci = z/qi
Once a round of the PGG is played, every agent updates
her strategy. We will focus now in the replicator update
rule as used in [16]. In this framework each agent i chooses
randomly one of her partners, say j, and compares their
benefits in the last round of the game. If fi(t) ≥ fj(t)
nothing happens and i stays the same in the next round,
xt+1i = x
t
i. However, when fj(t) > fi(t) agent i will take
the strategy of j (xt+1i = x
t
j) with probability:
Pi→j =
fj(t)− fi(t)
M
, (2)
whereM is a normalization term that accounts for the dif-
ference between the maximum possible payoff of i and j
and the minimum one. Thus, to computeM one must cal-
culate first the maximum and the minimum payoff each in-
dividual can obtain, and use these values, fmaxi and f
min
i ,
to compute the correct M associated to each couple of
nodes. In the case of the PGG with FCG we can take
advantage of the fixed size m of the groups to derive ana-
litically the value of M as a function of the number of
groups each of the two nodes, say i and j, belongs to. In
particular, when the r ≤ m we obtain:
M =
z
m
max [qi, qj ] [m(r + 1)− 2r] , (3)
while for r > m the expression for M reads:
M =
z
m
[max [qi, qj ](m− 1)r −min [qi, qj ](r −m)] (4)
For the case of FCI, it is not possible to derive M as a
function of qi and qj and one must compute the maximum
payoff for each node. This maximum payoff reads:
fmaxi =
r
m
N−m+1∑
j=1
Bji
∑
l
Bjl
zxl
ql
. (5)
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Fig. 3: Average fraction of cooperators, ρc, as a function of the normalized enhancement factor r/m (we have fixed z = 1).
Panels A, B and C (top) are for the FCG formulation of the PGG while D, E and F (bottom) are for its FCI version. The
panels correspond to m = 3 (A and D), m = 4 (B and E) and m = 5 (C and F). The curves with filled squares correspond to
ER networks while the results for SF one are those curved with filled circles. The triangles account for the level of cooperators
reached in each of the 102 realizations performed on SF networks for each value of r/m.
On the contrary, the minimum possible payoff of a node in
the FCI formulation does not the depends on the proper-
ties of the node: fmini = z(r −m)/m. Finally, let us note
that the group structure plays no role in this update stage,
as it makes use of the (projected) network of contacts.
Homogeneous vs Heterogenous networks. – We
now focus on the evolution of the cooperation for networks
with homogeneous group structure and either SF or ER
social patterns. To this end we simulate the evolutionary
dynamics of the PGG from an initial condition in which
the number of defectors and cooperators is roughly the
same and they are randomly distributed across the net-
work. For each value of the normalized enhancement fac-
tor r/m, we iterate a large number of rounds of the PGG
(typically 5 · 104) and we measure the average fraction
of cooperators, ρc, over a time window of 10
4 additional
rounds. The results reported for each value of r/m are the
average over 102 different initial conditions.
In the top panels of Fig. 3 we show the evolution of
ρc as a function of r/m for the PGG in its FCG ver-
sion. Each of the plots corresponds to a different value
of m, namely m = 3 in Fig. 3.A, m = 4 in Fig. 3.B and
m = 5 in Fig. 3.C, and all them show the curves ρc(r/m)
for both ER (filled squares) and SF (filled circles) topolo-
gies. The main finding is that the average level of cooper-
ation achieved on ER substrates is remarkably larger than
those observed on SF architecctures. Specifically, while
the onset of cooperation occurs around the same value
rc/m ≃ 0.5 (regardless of the value of m) for both ER and
SF substrates, the sharp boost in the cooperation of ER
networks is in contrast of the slow increment observed for
SF networks, particularly for m = 4 and m = 5. This
striking result points out that the ability of SF to out-
perform the promotion of cooperators on ER networks
reported in [16] is intrinsically due to the entanglement
of social and group heterogeneities (in [16] the associated
distribution of group sizes in SF networks is P (m) ∼ m−γ ,
γ being the same exponent of the degree distribution of
the SF network of contacts). In our setting, the discrimi-
nation of social and group heterogeneities in SF networks
and the addition of a realistic group architecture leads to a
dramatic change in the ability of heterogeneous networks
to foster cooperation.
The differences in the average level of cooperation are
not the unique difference between homogeneous and het-
erogeneous networks. In the panels of Fig. 3 we show the
values reached by ρc in each of the realizations for SF net-
works. It is clear that, after the cooperation onset, rc/m,
some of the realizations reach full cooperation while others
end up in a dynamical equilibrium in which cooperators
and defectors coexist. Note also that the value of ρc asso-
ciated to those solutions displaying coexistence decreases
significantly with m. On the other hand, ER networks
always lead to fixation, i.e., the dynamics always reaches
one absorbing state (either full defection or full coopera-
tion).
The results obtained with the FCI formulation are
shown in the bottom panels of Fig. 3. This scenario turns
out to favor the emergence of cooperation on SF networks
since its onset anticipates significantly with respect to the
FCG formulation (note that rc/m ∼ 0.2 for all the values
of m). On the contrary, for ER the onset of cooperation
takes place at the same value of r/m as in the FCG formu-
p-4
Public Goods games on structured networks
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5
ρ c
r/m
SF, m=3
SF, m=4
SF, m=5
ER, m=3
ER, m=4
ER, m=5
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5
ρ c
r/m
SF, m=3
SF, m=4
SF, m=5
ER, m=3
ER, m=4
ER, m=5
A
B
Fig. 4: We show the curves ρc(r/m) for the PGG (we have
fixed z = 1) with Moran selection on ER (filled symbols) and
SF (bold symbols) networks. Different group sizes are shown:
m = 3 (squares), m = 4 (circles) and m = 5 (triangles). Panel
A (top) is for the PGG in the FCG setting while B (bottom)
accounts for its FCI version.
lation. The enhancement shown by SF networks is clearly
due to the fact that in the FCI setting cooperators pay
the same cost regardless the number of groups they be-
long. This equivalence among degree-classes allows coop-
erator hubs to collect more payoff while, for defector hubs,
the change from FCG to FCI does not represent any im-
provement. On the other hand, the dynamical differences
between SF networks and ER networks persist since SF
allows coexistence of cooperators and defectors while ER
do not. Moreover, as m grows the frequency of the solu-
tion displaying coexistence increases and for large values
of r/m the average value of ρc is lower than that reached
by ER networks for m = 4 and m = 5. Therefore, in the
FCI setting, when both the size of the groups m and the
degree of enhancement r increase, ER substrates outper-
form the ability of SF networks to sustain cooperation.
Other update rules. – To complete our study, let
us now analyze the PGG with two other update rules,
namely, Moran selection and Unconditional Imitation
(UI). In the first case, a Moran agent i chooses one neigh-
bor j proportionally to her payoff (not randomly as in
the Replicator case). Then, agent i copies the strategy
of agent j for the next round, xt+1i = x
t
j , even if j has
performed worse than i [fi(t) > fj(t)]. Therefore, the
probability that i takes the strategy of j reads:
Pi→j =
fj(t)∑
〈j,i〉 fj(t)
, (6)
where the symbol 〈j, i〉 means that the sum is over the
partners of i. Note that, at variance with the Replicator
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Fig. 5: We show the curves ρc(r/m) for the PGG (we have fixed
z = 1) with the UI rule on ER (filled symbols) and SF (bold
symbols) networks. Different group sizes are shown: m = 3
(squares), m = 4 (circles) and m = 5 (triangles). Panel A
(top) is for the PGG in the FCG setting while B (bottom)
accounts for its FCI version.
rule, Moran selection allows mistakes. In the setting of UI
the strategy update is done as follows. After every round
each agent imitates the neighbour with the largest payoff,
provided it is larger than her own. Thus, at variance with
Moran selection and the Replicator update, UI is a com-
pletely deterministic rule while UI (as the Replicator rule)
does not allow mistakes. Note also that both Moran and
UI are context-focused rules (agents look at all their part-
ners), while the Replicator update is link-focused (agents
look one randomly chosen partner).
In Fig. 4 the results obtained with the Moran update
are shown. It is worth noticing that in FCG version (top
panel), there is no difference at all in behavior between SF
and ER, while in FCI (bottom panel) the onset of coop-
eration appears earlier in heterogeneous SF networks, as
with the Replicator rule, but in here the differences are
not as pronounced as in the former case. Therefore, un-
der Moran selection the degree of heterogeneity of social
interactions plays little role in the promotion of coopera-
tion. In Fig. 5 we show the behavior of systems with UI
update rule. For the FCG situation (top panel) the coop-
eration onset of SF and ER occurs simultaneously (around
rc/m ≃ 0.5). However, ER reaches full cooperation faster.
In this sense, for this cost scheme and under UI, ER pro-
motes cooperation better than SF (as in the Replicator
case). On the other hand, for the PGG with FCI (bottom
panel) cooperation on SF networks rises suddenly from
r = 0 (even earlier than in the Replicator case); however,
the ER network reaches full cooperation much before than
SF, particularly for m = 4 and m = 5. Interestingly, a
p-5
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plateau around ρc ≃ 0.5 appears in both FCG and FCI
cases for the SF network. For such values of r/m where
the plateau is observed the evolutionary dynamics ends
up suddenly (few generations after the initial condition)
reaching either a full cooperation or a full defection state.
Thus, the final outcome depends strongly on the initial
configuration of strategies so that for a large number of
realizations ρc → ρc(t = 0) = 0.5. We believe that this
is connected to the initial distribution of strategies in the
hubs as under this update scheme their behavior is very
determinant for the rest of the network.
Conclusions. – The work reported here allows us to
draw two important conclusions. First, the enhancement
of cooperation observed in PGG on SF networks with re-
spect to ER networks does not appear when taking into ac-
count the details of the group structure of the population.
This is clearly so in the FCG scheme, while under FCI we
observe that cooperation sets on quite earlier but as the
group size increases it becomes more difficult to reach full
cooperation. Second, SF and ER networks behave differ-
ently depending on the evolutionary dynamics under con-
sideration. Thus, the above comments apply to Replicator
dynamics, but Moran selection gives rise to basically simi-
lar behavior on both types of networks and UI reverses the
Replicator dynamics outcome, with SF networks perform-
ing worse in general than ER networks. Therefore, as has
been shown for other social dilemmas [13], the outcome of
a PGG on a network is far from universal and depends on
the network structure, on the evolutionary dynamics and
on the (mesoscale) group structure, a novel factor arising
from the game itself. We believe that this conclusion has
far reaching implications, the most important one being
the relevance of the network hierarchical structure for the
emergence of cooperation in a multi-player setup. Indeed,
our results strongly indicate that when trying to model co-
operative behavior, the outcome of the model may depend
very much on this mesoscale structure which, in turn, are
almost always determined by the kind of function or co-
operative enterprise the agents are involved in. In this
context, it becomes apparent that disentangling the scales
associated to the different types of relationships between
the agents is crucial in order to understand the observa-
tions in different social contexts.
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